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Modeling CO2 Emission Allowance Derivatives 
By Zhang, Jing Yu 
Efficient pricing of carbon derivative product is the core of the EU-ETS system, 
which plays an important role in keeping stability and developing the carbon 
financial market. The volatility of the underlying assets is the essential factor, 
so how to get the features of the volatility effectively becomes a key problem. 
Although the B-S model gives a classic tool for option pricing, it is based on te 
assumption that the volatility is constant. Increasingly, the research finds that 
financial data exhibit fat-tail and high kurtosis, so the assumption of constant 
volatility is not suitable.  
In this paper we first analyse the carbon emissions trading market, and then 
we use a GARCH model to appropriately reproduce the dynamics of the EUA 
futures` returns. We obtain the conclusions that GARCH(1,1) model is 
appropriately to reproduce the futures dynamics. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
Global warming and climate change are increasing considered a major threat 
to human health and the global economy due to their potential catastrophic 
consequences. A generally accepted theory is that the increasing 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is responsible for such 
change. One of the major international efforts to cope with this increasing 
environmental risk is the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is an international treaty 
that sets binding obligations on member countries to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. The major mechanism of greenhouse gases reduction 
dictated by the protocol was the trading of human-related emission 
allowances. 
In January 2005, the EU-wide CO2 greenhouse gas emissions trading 
system(EU ETS) formally entered into operation. Since then, the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX), European Climate Exchange (ECX), Powernext, 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), and New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) began trading EU allowance (EUA), certified emission reduction 
(CER), and their derivatives. The trading volumes in these markets are 
increasing as the EU ETS expands, therefore, the pricing of emission 
allowances and their derivatives is becoming an important issue. 
The major participants in the emission allowance market include polluting 
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industries, mainly electricity producers, and the so called carbon investors. 
Under the scheme, the emission intensive firms would be given the right to 
emit a certain amount of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. This 
allowance comes in the form of a new tradable asset-the European Union 
Allowance (EUA). One EUA gives the right to emit one ton of greenhouse 
gases. Surplus allowances can be stored for use during the following year or 
be traded in the market. In addition, the companies would have to surrender 
the missing allowances in the following year. In general, the amount of EUA 
stock of a company determines the degree of allowed plant utilization. 
Therefore, a shortage of EUA will result in a cut of the emission producing 
activity or the purchase of additional allowances.  
The introduction of emission allowances is obviously modifying operating 
costs of those sectors covered. Electric utilities, for instance, operate their 
power plants based in part on the price of the power and the relative cost of 
coal and natural gas. In a carbon constrained economy, the right to pollute is 
a new factor which comes into play. Now that a price has been put on such 
emission allowances, the differences in carbon intensity for fuels–coal and 
gas – could potentially change the way companies run their power plants and 
lead to an increased amount of emission-rights trading. 
The existence of mandatory emission trading schemes in Europe and the 
United States, and the increased liquidity of trading on futures contracts on 
CO2 emissions allowances, led naturally to the next step in the development 
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of these markets: These futures contracts are now used as underliers for a 
vibrant derivative market. In this paper, we will apply GARCH model to 
analyze the allowance futures prices, demonstrate its calibration to historical 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
When talking about solving the climate change problem, economists tend to 
prefer the use of economic means. However, there are also many papers 
doubting the effectiveness of using market to reduce greenhouse gas 
emission.  
There are two kinds of economics means, either by introducing the so call 
“carbon tax” or by using market mechanism. While the carbon tax may be 
fairer, it faces more political difficulty since it concerns the interests of many 
parties. In practice, carbon trading is a more common solution and an 
example might be the EU ETS. 
Since the emission allowance trading is at the core of the carbon market, 
research of the mechanism of this trading system would be a hot topic. In this 
field, researchers mainly investigate the market mechanism and the trading 
effectiveness. The major method for allowance distribution is through auction. 
Though auction is more effective, it creates room for corruption and 
speculation which makes the market unstable.  
2.1 Whether the current carbon market mechanism is 
beneficial for emission reduction is still controversial 
Croker(1966) discussed the possibility of applying Coase's theory of property 
in controlling greenhouse emission. According to Croker, since the external 
effect of greenhouse gas emission reduction crosses the country boundaries, 
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such approach is difficult to apply in practice. The main barrier is how to 
coordinate the different interests among different countries and groups. 
When it comes to the effectiveness of the current mechanism, the controversy 
reflects mainly in two aspects. For one thing, whether the global trade helps to 
reduce greenhouse emission is still in doubt. For another, due to the different 
stages of economic development, the costs of emission reduction vary a lot. 
How to allocate the cost among different countries is a problem. 
Some experts think that global trading is not a good thing in terms of 
environmental protection. Chichilnisky (1994) holds that global trading would 
do harm to environment protection. He thought that due to the difference in 
trading structure and status, developed countries can take advantage in free 
trade and reduce greenhouse emission while such trading has a negative 
impact on the environment in developing countries. As a whole, the 
international trading is bad for environment protection. Copeland and Taylor 
(1994) used a North-South trade model to analyze the relationship between 
global trading and environment protection. They found that the environment 
standards of developed countries are obviously stricter than that of 
developing countries. Such differences in standard help the developed 
countries improve their environments through trading while exacerbate 
environmental degradation of developing countries. 
On the other hand, Grossman and Krueger (1991) build a model to describe 
the impact global trading has on the environment. They divide different factors 
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in the model into three effects: technology, structure and scale. Based on this 
model, Antweiler et al (2001) used data from more than forty countries to 
analyze the relationship between free trade and carbon emissions and found 
that the positive effect of technology is greater than the negative effect of 
scale. Thus, Antweiler holds that global trading is good for environmental 
protection. 
Things get more complicated when it comes to the issue of emission 
reduction responsibility allocation. Developed countries insist that the 
responsibility should be allocated in terms of greenhouse gas production 
while the developing countries think those who consume the end products 
should be responsible for that. 
A study by Kondo et al (1998) found that, before 1985 Japan was a carbon 
export country, but the situation changed after 1990 when it turned into a 
carbon import country. By calculating the carbon in 24 countries` trading 
goods, Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) found that international industrial transfer 
has a significant impact on carbon emission. Peters and Hertwich (2008) 
found that in 2001 global trading accounted for 5.3 billion tons of carbon 
emission and the developed countries are all net carbon import countries. 
China is the country that has the most carbon emissions. However, a study 
from Li and Hewitt (2008) argued that global trading might be part of the 
reason. According to them, the reason why the U.K.`s domestic carbon 
emission reduced about 11% in 2004 is that they import China`s goods 
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instead of producing themselves. A study by Wang and Watson (2007) had a 
similar conclusion. According to their work, in 2004, 23% of China`s domestic 
carbon emission resulted from exports.  
Based on the above, Ferng (2003) thought, the end product consumers rather 
than the direct carbon emitters should bear the responsibility. Schelling (1992) 
insisted that the cost to reduce emission in developing countries is larger than 
in developed countries. Thus, Schelling holds that it is unfair to force 
developing countries to reduce emissions and developed countries should 
take more responsibility. According to Schelling, developed countries can 
help developing countries to reduce emissions by capital and technological 
transfers and support.  
2.2 Which method is more effective, trading or tax? 
In practice, there are two ways of market-based policy instruments: the first 
one is emission allowance trading, which is based on the Coase's theory of 
property. The second one is the so-called “carbon tax” or Pigouivain tax. It is 
still controversial that which approach is more effective. 
A Pigouivain tax is not a new thing. It refers to a tax applied to a market 
activity that is generating negative externalities. The tax is intended to correct 
an inefficient market outcome, and does so by being set equal to the negative 
externalities. In practice, governments would levy and collect environmental 
taxes, including carbon tariffs. The U.S.A. is always an advocate for an 
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international environmental tax. 
Views that for the carbon tax are as follows: 
From the angle of social welfare, Nordhaus (2006) implied that carbon tax 
adds to the cost of using natural resource and reduces the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Moreover, the emission allowance distribution system is 
far from perfect and can make room for corruption while a carbon tax seems 
fairer in this sense. 
From the angle of social equality, Ellerman,A.(2005) thought carbon tax is a 
better approach. Ellerman mentioned that by collecting a carbon tax, those 
who cause more negative externalities would pay more and this would be 
fairer. Ellerman also discussed the political challenge since the traditional 
industries with dense carbon emission are politically powerful. The 
introduction of such tax would be a tough task.  
Views that are for the emission allowance trading give the following reasons: 
In term of cost saving, Montgomery (1972) gave the conclusion that emission 
allowance trading is the least expensive approach. Stern (2007) thought, the 
implementation of emission allowance trading would be easier than other 
alternatives, and the most effective one too. Edenhofer et al (2008) 
mentioned that a short-term carbon tax would be a good choice, but in 
long-run, considering the serious outcome of climate change, carbon 
emission allowance trading would be better. 
From the angle of long-term corporate operation, Murray et al (2009) thought, 
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if the banking of emission allowances is allowed, it would be beneficial for the 
corporate development while carbon tax does not has such advantage.  
2.3 Study of Carbon Emission Allowance Trading System 
The first attempt to use market mechanism to solve pollution problem was 
made by Dales (1968). Dales thought the best and cheapest way to control 
pollution is to treat the right to pollute as property. This also became the 
theoretical foundation of the emission allowance market. Based on that, 
Montgomery (1972) tried to use a model to describe the effectiveness of 
using market to solve the pollution problem.  
Stavins (1995) pointed out that transaction costs could do harm to the market, 
as they would reduce both supply and demand of the emission allowance 
market, resulting in a decline of volume.  
Egterten and Weber (1996) discussed the trading system using game theory. 
According to their work, if the cost of emission allowance is higher than the 
marginal fine, a moral hazard issue would occur. 
2.4 The Distribution Method of Emission Allowance 
There are mainly two kinds of emission allowance distribution method: free 
distribution and auction. 
Pizer (2003) thought auctions could be a more effective way, but the 
disadvantage is that the implementation would have to face the pressure from 
A00362758 Zhang, Jing Yu 
10 
 
the greenhouse gas emitters. Cramton and Ken (2002) discussed the 
disadvantage of free distribution: First, it might be unfair for the public since 
within the free allowance amount, firms would not pay for the negative 
externality they caused. Second, such a free distribution would reduce the 
enterprise's competition consciousness. 
Eventually, experts agree on auctions being more efficient. However, in 
practice, if we take EU ETS as an example, free distribution is the primary 
way. The reason is that it would be more feasible for the early implementation 
since auctions are unpopular among firms and would faces political 
challenges. But the implementation of an auction is to be the trend. An 
important amendment of the European commission in 2008 decided that the 
main way of emission allowance distribution would be transfer through 
auction and by the year 2020, 80% of the allowance will be distributed 
through auction. 
2.5 Studies of Emission Allowance Market Efficiency 
By 2008, the volume of the global emission market had reached about 100 
billion U.S. dollar, and research of the emission allowance market efficiency 
has been a hot topic. So far, the focus is on the relationship between 
allowance price and related commodities prices, usually the price of electricity. 
Oberndorfer (2009) used empirical experiment to show that the price of EUA 
is related to the stock prices of electricity enterprises. Zachman and von 
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Hirschhausen (2008) found that the rise of EUA price has a greater impact on 
electricity price than the decline of EUA price do. They viewed this as a sign of 
lacking competition.  
As the price of an EUA is related to the stock price of major emitter firms, the 
emission allowance market does help to build a low carbon emission 
economy. 
2.6 Empirical Studies of Carbon Financial Products 
Research on spot market: 
Chesney and Taschini (2008) use an endogenous model to analyze the spot 
price of carbon emission market. Their study showed that asymmetric 
information problem existed, which might make the market less efficient. 
Benz and truck (2007) observed the leptokurtosis and fat tail phenomenon in 
the dynamic change of EUA spot price.  
The prices of EUA futures recorded a tremendous fluctuation between Phase 
I and Phase II. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) thought that this was 
because the prohibition of any unused EUA in Phase I to be stored and used 
in Phase II. The fluctuation of future prices led to high volatility in the spot 
market. Daskalakis et al (2007) mentioned that one of the most important 
reasons for the rise of EUA price is the uncertainty of government policies, 
which adds to the risk of investors. The rise of prices reflects a risk premium 
demanded by the investors. 
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Research on the relationship between spot prices and future prices: 
Theissen (2009) found that when there are arbitrage opportunities, the future 
markets can observe more market signals, meaning the future markets are 
more sensitive to market information. Thus, when there are arbitrage 
opportunities the spot prices would converge to future prices. 
Research on the pricing of carbon derivatives: 
As the carbon financial market grows, new types of derivatives are put into 
the market. They are playing an increasingly important role in the trading 
system and the demand for pricing accuracy is getting higher and higher. 
According to Daskalakis et al (2007), the volume of EUA futures market is 
about 5 times higher than the volume of the EUA spot market in 2006. Also, 
data from ECX (2008) shows that in the first season of 2008, there were 
653502 units of EUA being traded while, during the same period, the volume 
of EUA futures being traded was 14391000 units. 
Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) found that risk-neutral pricing theory can 
be applied to the study of carbon derivative. Benz, E. and Truck, S. (2007) 
thought this was due to the difference of fluctuation and prices in different 
phases. As a result, the return of carbon derivative can be better described 
using an AR-GARCH model rather than a Auto-Regressive model and Mean 
Reversion model. 
Also, Paolella and Taschini (2008) suggested the use of a GARCH model to 
solve the heteroscedasticity problem observed in data when analyzing the 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
3.1 Futures Pricing Theory 
Futures are one of the most fundamental derivative products. The most 
widely used pricing model is the cost-of-carry model as follows (Equation 3.1) 
𝐹𝑡(𝑇) = 𝑒
(𝑟−𝑐)(𝑇−𝑡)𝑆𝑡                                                3.1 
where 𝐹𝑡(𝑇) indicate the price of contract in time t, 𝑆𝑡 indicate the spot price, 
r indicate risk free rate and c is the cost of carry 
3.2 Option Pricing Theory 
3.2.1 Black–Scholes Model 
The Black–Scholes or Black–Scholes–Merton model is a mathematical model 
of a financial market containing certain derivative investment instruments. 
From the model, one can deduce the Black–Scholes formula, which gives a 
theoretical estimate of the price of European-style options. 
The Black–Scholes model of the market for a particular stock makes the 
following explicit assumptions: 
1. There is no arbitrage opportunity (i.e., there is no way to make a riskless 
profit). 
2. It is possible to borrow and lend cash at a known constant risk-free 
interest rate. 
3. It is possible to buy and sell any amount of stock, even fractional (this 
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includes short selling). 
4. The above transactions do not incur any fees or costs (i.e., frictionless 
market). 
5. The stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift 
and volatility. 
6. The underlying security does not pay a dividend. 
Let 
S, be the price of the stock (please note inconsistencies as below). 
V(S, t), the price of a derivative as a function of time and stock price. 
C(S, t) the price of a European call option and P(S, t) the price of a European 
put option. 
K, the strike price of the option. 
r, the annualized risk-free interest rate, continuously compounded (the force 
of interest). 
μ, the drift rate of S, annualized. 
σ, the volatility of the stock's returns; this is the square root of the quadratic 
variation of the stock's log price process. 
t, a time in years; we generally use: now=0, expiry=T. 
∏ , the value of a portfolio. 
Finally we will use N(x) which denotes the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function,  
                                      3.2 
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N'(x) which denotes the standard normal probability density function, 
                                                             3.3 
The value of a call option for a non-dividend-paying underlying stock in terms 
of the Black–Scholes parameters is: 
 
                                                                              3.4 
The price of a corresponding put option based on put-call parity is: 
 
                                                                            3.5 
For both, as above: 
  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution 
  is the time to maturity 
  is the spot price of the underlying asset 
  is the strike price 
  is the risk free rate (annual rate, expressed in terms 
of continuous compounding) 
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  is the volatility of returns of the underlying asset 
3.2 GARCH model 
The traditional B-S option pricing model assumes that the returns of 
underlying assets have a constant volatility, which is not true. As a matter of 
fact, the return series usually have the following properties: 1. Volatility 
clustering, one of the most important features of financial time series data. 2. 
Heteroscedasticity, assets prices are usually volatile. 3. Leptokurtosis and fat 
tail, returns of assets usually do not follow the normal distribution and the 
distributions tend to have leptokurtosis and fat tails.  
First introduced by Engle (1982), the ARCH (AutoreRressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) model can solve the very problems of return series data. 
Based on that, Bollerslev (1986) developed the GARCH (Generalized 
AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model. The advantage of 
GARCH model is that it considers the volatility clustering feature of time 
series data and can smooth the leptokurtosis. Since it can accurately catch 
the features of time series data, the GARCH model is widely used. 
A GARCH(p,q) model is as follow: 
ℎ𝑡








                        
𝒙𝒕 = 𝝁𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕 
𝜺𝒕 = 𝒉𝒕
𝟐                                                                   3.6 
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Where xt is the return series, 𝝁𝒕 is conditional expected value, 𝜺𝒕 is the 
residue, 𝒉𝒕
𝟐 is the conditional variance. To keep the model stationary, the 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Analysis of Carbon Derivative 
Pricing 
4.1 Data Selection 
This paper uses the daily closing prices of EUA future contracts whose 
maturity date is December 2012. The time period of these contracts is from 
January 2008 to August 2012. Figure 4.1 shows a plot of daily EUA future 
price for the period January 1st 2008 to August 27th 2012. The data were 
provided by the European Environment Agency. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 EUA future contract price 
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4.2 Processing Data 
4.2.1 Analyzing the Logreturns of EUA Futures 
Figure 4.2 shows a plot of the EUA future logreturns 𝑦𝑡 ≡ log𝑆𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑡−1 for 
the whole considered period. Figure 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
logreturens. The logreturns distribution has a skewness of 0.197421 and a 
kurtosis of 11.38327. Obviously, the data show the properties of leptokurtosis, 
fat tail and volatility clustering.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Logreturns of EUA future 
 
Figure 4.3 Descriptive statistics of logreturns 




4.2.2 Unit Root Test 
Table 4.1 shows the unit root test of the logreturns. We can see that the ADF 
statistic is -33.34020<-3.3965816, meaning at a 1% confidence level we 
reject the hypothesis that there is a unit root. Thus, the time series is 
stationary. 
Table 4.1 ADF test of the logreturns 
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4.2.3 Autocorrelation Coefficient Testing and Partial 
Autocorrelation Coefficient Testing 
Table 4.2 shows the ACF test and PACF test results. We can see that at 15th 
lags level there is autocorrelation. Thus, we can use the following equation to 
run a LS regression: 
𝑟𝑡 = c + a𝑟𝑡−15 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the logreturns at time t. 
Table 4.3 shows the result of the LS regression.  
𝑟𝑡 = −0.000903 − 0.033769𝑟𝑡−15 + 𝜀𝑡 
Table 4.2 ACF and PACF test result of logreturns 
 
Table 4.3 LS regression of logreturns 
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Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the ACF and PACF tests of the residual and 
residual-square respectively. Obviously, there is autocorrelation in 
residue-square series. Figure 4.4 shows the plot of residual-square. From this 
figure, we can conclude that the fluctuation of 𝜀𝑡
2 has the properties of time 
varying and clustering. Thus, we can use the GARCH model to analyze the 
behavior of the logreturns. 
Table 4.4 ACF and PACF test of residual 
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Table 4.5 ACF and PACF test of Residual-square 
 
      
 
 
Figure 4.4 Residual-square 
 
4.2.4 GARCH(1,1) Modeling 
GARCH(1,1) model: 
𝑟𝑡 = C + 𝜀𝑡                                                        4.2 




2 = ω + α𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                             4.3        
where 𝑟𝑡 is the logreturn of time t. According to the requirement of GARCH 
model, we have α >0, 𝛽>0, α + 𝛽 <1. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of GARCH(1,1) modeling. The equation of the 
estimation is:  
𝑟𝑡 = 0.000725 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 2.50e − 05 + 0.164437𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 0.810531𝜎𝑡−1
2  
α + 𝛽 = 0.97 < 1 Thus, the model is stationary. 
Table 4.6 GARCH(1,1) modeling 
 
Table 4.7 shows the ACF and PACF test result of the GARCH(1,1) model. 
From the tables we can see that compared to the original logreturns series, 
the GARCH(1,1) model does not have the problem of autocorrelation. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
Derivative pricing has been the core issue of financial markets since the 
1970`s at least. By investigating the time series price data of the EUA futures, 
we found that there is an obvious leptokurtosis and fat tail phenomenon. For a 
better description of the time series data, a GARCH(1,1) model is used to run 
the empirical experiments. 
The experiment results show that a GARCH(1,1) model works well in 
capturing the volatility of EUA futures. It has a satisfactory descriptive power 
on the fluctuation of the EUA futures market. 
In order to make a convincing conclusion, however, a large amount of data is 
needed for a GARCH model. Since the EUA spot market did not exist until 
2005, not to mention the EUA future market, the amount of EUA future price 
data is limited. Moreover, the EUA market is a new market with lots of 
speculation and its governance is far from perfect. All these add to the 
uncertainty of our model.  
In spite of these shortcomings, this study of applying the GARCH(1,1) model 
in EUA futures pricing can lay a foundation for further research. 
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